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Abstract—Google has recently introduced the Cloud Vision
API for image analysis. According to the demonstration website,
the API “quickly classifies images into thousands of categories,
detects individual objects and faces within images, and finds and
reads printed words contained within images.” It can be also used
to “detect different types of inappropriate content from adult to
violent content.”
In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of Google Cloud
Vision API to input perturbation. In particular, we show that
by adding sufficient noise to the image, the API generates
completely different outputs for the noisy image, while a human
observer would perceive its original content. We show that
the attack is consistently successful, by performing extensive
experiments on different image types, including natural images,
images containing faces and images with texts. For instance,
using images from ImageNet dataset, we found that adding an
average of 14.25% impulse noise is enough to deceive the API.
Our findings indicate the vulnerability of the API in adversarial
environments. For example, an adversary can bypass an image
filtering system by adding noise to inappropriate images. We
then show that when a noise filter is applied on input images,
the API generates mostly the same outputs for restored images as
for original images. This observation suggests that cloud vision
API can readily benefit from noise filtering, without the need for
updating image analysis algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Machine Learning (ML) techniques have
been extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particu-
larly visual classification problems, where new algorithms re-
ported to achieve or even surpass the human performance [1]–
[3]. Success of ML algorithms has led to an explosion in
demand. To further broaden and simplify the use of ML
algorithms, cloud-based services offered by Amazon, Google,
Microsoft, BigML, and others have developed ML-as-a-service
tools. Thus, users and companies can readily benefit from ML
applications without having to train or host their own models.
Recently, Google introduced the Cloud Vision API for
image analysis [4]. A demonstration website has been also
launched, where for any selected image, the API outputs
the image labels, identifies and reads the texts contained in
the image and detects the faces within the image. It also
determines how likely is that the image contains inappropriate
contents, including adult, spoof, medical, or violence contents.
The implicit assumption in designing and developing ML
models is that they will be deployed in noise-free and benign
settings. Real-world sensors, however, suffer from noise, blur,
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the attack on Google Cloud Vision API.
By adding sufficient noise to the image, we can force the API
to output completely different labels. Captions are the labels
with the highest confidence returned by the API. For noisy
images, none of the output labels are related to corresponding
original images. Images are chosen from the ImageNet dataset.
and other imperfections. Hence, designing computer vision
models to be robust is imperative for real-world applications,
such as banking, medical diagnosis, and autonomous driving.
Moreover, recent research have pointed out the vulnerability
of ML models in adversarial environments [5]–[7]. Security
evaluation of ML systems is an emerging field of study.
Several papers have presented attacks on various ML systems,
such as voice interfaces [8], face-recognition systems [9], toxic
comment detectors [10], and video annotation systems [11].
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In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of Google Cloud
Vision API to input perturbations. 1 In particular, we inves-
tigate whether we can modify an image in such a way that
a human observer would perceive its original content, but
the API generates different outputs for it. For modifying the
images, we add either impulse noise or Gaussian noise to
them. Due to the inherent low-pass filtering characteristic of
the humans vision system, humans are capable of perceiving
image contents from images slightly corrupted by noise [12].
Our experimental results show that by adding sufficient
noise to the image, the API is deceived into returning labels
which are not related to the original image. Figure 1 illustrates
the attack by showing original and noisy images along with the
most confident labels returned by the API. We show that the
attack is consistently successful, by performing extensive ex-
periments on different image types, including natural images,
images containing faces and images with texts. Our findings
indicate the vulnerability of Google cloud vision API in real-
world applications. For example, a driveless car may wrongly
identify the objects in rainy weather. Moreover, the API can
be subject to attacks in adversarial environments. For example,
a search engine may suggest irrelevant images to users, or an
image filtering system can be bypassed by adding noise to
inappropriate images.
We then evaluate different methods for improving the ro-
bustness of the API. Since we only have a black-box access to
the API, we assess whether noise filtering can improve the API
performance on noisy inputs, while maintaining the accuracy
on clean images. Our experimental results show that when
a noise filter is applied on input images, the API generates
mostly the same outputs for restored images as for original
images. This observation suggests that the cloud vision API
can readily benefit from noise filtering, without the need for
updating the image analysis algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II re-
views related literature and Section III presents noise models.
The proposed attack on Google cloud vision API is given in
Section IV. Section V describes some countermeasures to the
attack and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several papers have recently showed that the performance
of deep convolutional neural networks drops when the model
is tested on distorted inputs, such as noisy or blurred im-
ages [13]–[15]. For improving the robustness of machine
learning models to input perturbations, an end-to-end archi-
tecture is proposed in [16] for joint denoising, deblurring, and
classification. In [17], the authors presented a training method
to stabilize deep networks against small input distortions. It
has been also observed that augmenting training data with
perturbed images can enhance the model robustness [13], [18].
In contrast, in this paper we demonstrate the vulnerability of
a real-world image classifier system to input perturbations.
1The experiments are performed on the interface of Google Cloud Vision
API’s website on Apr. 7, 2017.
We also show that the model robustness can be improved by
applying a noise filter on input images, thus without the need
for fine-tuning the model.
The noisy images used in our attack can be viewed as a
form of adversarial examples [19]. An adversarial example
is defined as a modified input, which causes the classifier
to output a different label, while a human observer would
recognize its original content. Note that we could deceive
the could vision API without having any knowledge about
the learning algorithm. Also, unlike the existing black-box
attacks on learning systems [20], [21], we have no information
about the training data or even the set of output labels of the
model. Moreover, unlike the current methods for generating
adversarial examples [22], we perturb the input completely
randomly, which results in a more serious attack vector in
real-world applications.
III. IMAGE NOISE
A color image x is a three-dimensional array of pixels xi,j,k,
where (i, j) is the image coordinate and k ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes
the coordinate in color space. In this paper, we encode the
images in RGB color space. Most image file formats use 24
bits per pixel (8 bits per color channel), which results in 256
different colors for each color space. Therefore, the minimum
and maximum values of each pixel are 0 and 255, respectively,
which correspond to the darkest and brightest colors.
For modifying the images, we add either impulse noise or
Gaussian noise to them. These noise types often occur dur-
ing image acquisition and transmission [23]. Impulse Noise,
also known as Salt-and-Pepper Noise, is commonly modeled
by [24]:
x˜i,j,k =

0 with probability p2
xi,j,k with probability 1− p
255 with probability p2
where x, x˜ and p are the original and noisy images and
the noise density, respectively. Impulse noise can be removed
using spatial filters which exploit the correlation of adjacent
pixels. We use the weighted-average filtering method, pro-
posed in [24], for restoring images corrupted by impulse noise.
A noisy image corrupted by Gaussian noise is obtained
as xˆi,j,k = xi,j,k + z, where z is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable. The pixel values of the noisy image should
be clipped, so that they remain in the range of 0 to 255.
Gaussian noise can be reduced by filtering the input with low-
pass kernels [23].
For assessing the quality of the restored image x∗ compared
to original image x, we use the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(PSNR). For images of size d1 × d2 × 3, PSNR value is
computed as follows [25]:
PSNR = 10 · log10
(
2552
1
3 d1 d2
∑
i,j,k(xi,j,k − x∗i,j,k)2
)
.
PSNR value is measured in dB. Typical values for the PSNR
are usually considered to be between 20 and 40 dB, where
higher is better [26].
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IV. THE PROPOSED ATTACK ON CLOUD VISION API
In this section, we describe the attack on Google Cloud
Vision API. The goal of the attack is to modify a given
image in such a way that the API returns completely different
outputs than the ones for original image, while a human
observer would perceive its original content. We perform the
experiments on different image types, including natural images
from the ImageNet dataset [27], images containing faces from
the Faces94 dataset [28], and images with text. When selecting
an image for analysis, the API outputs the image labels, detects
the faces within the image, and identifies and reads the texts
contained in the image.
The attack procedure is as follows. We first test the API
with the original image and record the outputs. We then test
the API with a modified image, generated by adding very
low-density impulse noise. If we can force the API to output
completely different labels, or to fail to detect faces or identify
the texts within the image, we declare the noisy image as the
adversary’s image. Otherwise, we increase the noise density
and retry the attack. We continue to increase the noise density
until we can successfully force the API to output wrong labels.
In experiments, we start the attack with 5% impulse noise and
increase the noise density each time by 5%.
Figure 1 shows the API’s output label with the highest
confidence score, for the original and noisy images. As can
be seen, unlike the original images, the API wrongly labels
the noisy images, despite that the objects in noisy images are
easily recognizable. Trying on 100 images of the ImageNet
dataset, we needed on average 14.25% impulse noise density
to deceive the cloud vision API. Figure 2 shows the adversary’s
success rate versus the noise density. As can be seen, by
adding 35% impulse noise, the attack always succeeded on
the samples from ImageNet dataset.
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Fig. 2: Adversary’s success rate versus the impulse noise
density for sample images from ImageNet dataset. By adding
35% impulse noise, the attack always succeeds in changing
the API’s output labels.
Figure 3 shows sample images from the Faces94 dataset and
the corresponding noisy images. Unlike the original images,
the API fails to detect the face in noisy ones. Trying on the
Original image Noisy image (20% impulse noise)
Original image Noisy image (30% impulse noise)
Fig. 3: Images of faces, chosen from the Faces94 dataset, and
their noisy versions. Unlike the original images, cloud vision
API fails to detect the face in noisy images.
Original image Noisy image (35% impulse noise)
Fig. 4: An images with text and its noisy version. Unlike the
original image, cloud vision API fails to identify any texts in
noisy image.
first 20 images of each female and male categories, we needed
on average 23.8% impulse noise density to deceive the cloud
vision API. Similarly, figure 4 shows an image with text and
the corresponding noisy image. The API correctly reads the
text within the original image, but fails to identify any texts
in the noisy one, despite that the text within the noisy image
is easily readable.
We also tested the API with images corrupted by Gaussian
noise and obtained similar results as impulse noise. That is,
by adding zero-mean Gaussian noise with sufficient variance,
we can always force the API to generate a different output
than the one for the original image, while a human observer
would perceive its original content.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
The success of our attack indicates the importance of de-
signing the learning system to be robust to input perturbations.
It has been shown that the robustness of ML algorithms can be
improved by using regularization or data augmentation during
training [29]. In [30], the authors proposed adversarial training,
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(a) Original image (b) Noisy image (10% impulse noise) (c) Restored image (PSNR = 33 dB)
(d) API’s output labels for original image. (e) API’s output labels for noisy image. (f) API’s output labels for restored image.
Fig. 5: Screenshots of the labels returned by cloud vision API for original, noisy and restored images. The original image is
chosen from ImageNet dataset. None of the labels returned for the noisy image are related to labels of the original image,
while labels of the restored image are mostly the same as the ones for original image.
which iteratively creates a supply of adversarial examples and
includes them into the training data. Approaches based on
robust optimization however may not be practical, since the
model needs to be retrained.
For image recognition algorithms, a more viable approach
is preprocessing the inputs. Natural images have special
properties, such as high correlation among adjacent pixels,
sparsity in transform domain or having low energy in high
frequencies [23]. Noisy inputs typically do not lie in the same
space as natural images. Therefore, by projecting the input
image down to the space of natural images, which is often
done by passing the image through a filter, we can reverse the
effect of the noise or adversarial perturbation.
We assess the performance of the cloud vision API when a
noise filter is applied before the image analysis algorithms.
We did the experiments on all the sample images from
ImageNet and Faces94 datasets, corrupted by either impulse
or Gaussian noise. Restored images are generated by applying
the weighted-average filter [24] for impulse noise and a low-
pass filter for Gaussian noise. In all cases, when testing on the
restored image, the API generates mostly the same outputs as
for the original image.
Figure 5 shows the screenshots of the API’s output labels
for original, noisy and restored images of a sample image from
ImageNet dataset. As can be seen, none of the labels returned
PSNR = 40.05 dB PSNR = 37.26 dB PSNR = 33.16 dB
Fig. 6: The restored images, generated by applying the
weighted-average filter [24] on the noisy images of figures 3
and 4. Captions show the PSNR values with respect to the
original images. Although the API fails to detect the face in the
noisy face images, it correctly detects the same face attributes
for restored images as the original images. Also, unlike the
noisy version of the text image, the API correctly reads the
text within the restored image.
for the noisy image are related to labels of the original image.
However, the labels of the restored image are mostly the same
as the ones for original image.
Similarly, figure 6 shows restored images of the images with
faces from figure 3 and the image with text from figure 4.
Unlike the noisy images, the API correctly detects the same
face attributes for restored face images as original images, and
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can read the text within the restored text image. The results
suggest that the cloud vision API can readily benefit from
noise filtering prior to applying image analysis algorithms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that Google Cloud Vision API
can be easily deceived by an adversary without compromising
the system or having any knowledge about the specific details
of the algorithms used. In essence, we found that by adding
noise, we can always force the API to output irrelevant labels
or to fail to detect any face or text within the image. We
also showed that when testing with the restored images, the
API generates mostly the same outputs as for the original
images. This suggests that the system’s robustness can be
readily improved by applying a noise filter on the inputs,
without the need for updating the image analysis algorithms.
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